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APPENDIX S 
Trireme Warfare in Herodotus 
§1. Herodotus describes a vigorous era in the history of the maritime traffic and 
warfare in the Mediterranean. Greek• and Phoenician colonies anchored far-flung 
trading networks north to the Black Sea and west along the Mrican and European 
coasts to Spain and even beyond the Straits of Gibraltar. b Sea lanes had to be policed, 
colonies protected, parochial navies developed and increased. Furthermore, naval 
strength, always a prerogative of coastal and island states, became an important factor 
in the expanding domains of inland powers such as Sparta' and Persia. The jostling of 
all these escalating commercial and political interests in the seas of the Mediterranean 
fostered developments in ship design, construction, and handling. 
§2. Herodotus is one of our primary sources for these developments. But he 
assumes a firsthand familiarity with seagoing ships of the Greeks and Persians, and 
so his abbreviated references do not provide us with the complete manual of ancient 
seafaring in the archaic Aegean• that we would have liked. It is not easy to complete 
the picture. There are images of ships, primarily on Attic pottery, but they are diffi­
cult to interpret. Underwater explorations have yielded only cargo ships; ancient 
warships have left few traces. Men jumped off sinking ships, and without the weight 
of human ballast, the empty wooden hulls floated just below the surface and were 
often salvaged before they sank completely. Those hulls that did sink to the seafloor 
had no cargo to protect them from marine predators and deterioration, and so there 
is now little or nothing left for underwater archaeologists to discover. Especially 
conspicuous is the lack of Phoenician testimony; we know of the ships and maritime 
achievements of these most excellent seafarers and sea fighters mostly through sec­
ondhand, often hostile accounts. Thus Herodotus' story remains the essential 
account of archaic maritime history. 
S.la Greece (Hellas): MapS, AX. S.lc Sparta: MapS, BX. 
S.l b Europe, Phoenicia, Euxine (Black) Sea, Africa S.2a Aegean Sea: MapS. 
(Libya), Spain (Iberia), Straits of Gibraltar (Pillars 
ofHerakles): MapS, locator. 
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Warships 
§3. He recounts the age of the development of the triereis (anglicized as 
"trireme"), the oared vessel that would become the premier warship of the classical 
world. In the centuries between Homer and Thucydides, warships evolved from 
transportS that carried warriors to the battlegrounds where they disembarked and 
fought on land, to fighting machines designed to ram and sink opponents on the 
seas. During the long transitional period before triremes achieved their classical form 
and purpose (and even then), many navies relied on a third option: using ships to 
carry troops on deck for launching missiles at the enemy and engaging in pirate-style 
boarding at sea. Whether the battle plan depended on boarding or ramming, suc­
cessful maneuvers against the enemy depended on the rowers (sailing and wind 
being too variable to be counted on in battle), and thus developments in warship 
design focused on increasing the number of oars, and thereby power, without sacri­
ficing efficiency. There came a point beyond which it was not feasible to lengthen 
wooden hulls for the purpose of adding rowers-the increased length made the 
hulls either fragile or too cumbersome-and the most significant change in warship 
design thereafter, in the centuries preceding the Persian War, was the incorporation 
of a second and eventually a third level of oarsmen. There is no unambiguous evi­
dence for where and when these advances were made or how quickly they spread. 
Scholarly debate on these topics is lively. 
§4. Herodotus' narrative portrays a general adoption of triremes over the course 
of the sixth century, but the specific dynamics of that shift are difficult to define, 
partly because Herodotus so often uses vague vocabulary. The term that he uses most 
frequently in his catalogs of fleets and descriptions of naval maneuvers is neus (the 
Ionic form of naus, whence "nautical" and "naval"), a word that simply means ship. 
Context is the indication that tteus means a warship (rather than a merchant ship),' 
and sometimes it is clear that Herodotus is referring specifically to triremes. But there 
are many instances when the reference cannot be defined. His narrative does indicate 
that the changeover was gradual, for the fleets of the early fifth century arc still an 
amalgam of older and new-model warships. The old-fashioned vessels were triacon­
ters (thirty-oared) and penteconters (fifty-oared, with either one or two levels of row­
ers). Triaconters arc listed in the catalog of Xerxes' fleet (7.97), and a triaconter 
served as messenger ship to the Greek navy stationed at Artemision (8.2l.l).b Pente­
conters were still substantial elementS of the navies mustered in 480. 
§5. Probably during the tyranny of Polykrates of Sarnos• (533-522), and certainly 
by the time of the Ionian Revolt ( 499), the trireme had become the cutting edge of 
naval power. The trireme is thought to have taken itS name from the arrangement of 
S.4a Hcrodoms occasionally modifies 11tm with mdrt 
(�long") to specify a warship; a nms strongttle 
(�round") means specifically a cargo ship. The term 
ploi11 usually signifies vessels other than warships. 
S.4b Artemision: MapS, AX. Triaconters in the Persian 
Acct, 7.97; among Gclon's ships, 7.163.1; among the 
Greeks at Artemision, 8.12; at Salamis, 8.48. 
S.Sa Samos: MapS, BY. 
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rowers. In its classical form, the hull enclosed two levels of rowers, and a third row of 
oarsmen sat in outriggers mounted along the topsides of the hull. Only the topmost 
rowers were in a position to see the oar blades enter the water, and each rower in the 
upper bank was responsible for guiding the two rowers below him to adjust their 
stroke to fit the general cadence. Thus the trireme crew worked in teams of three, and 
this is why the Greeks referred to these warships as triereis, "three-fitted." This config­
uration packed 170 rowers into a hull about 120 teet long and 15 feet wide, and opti­
mized the balance of power, spt:ed, and maneuverability: a longer boat with more 
rowers would have been heavier and more difficult to maneuver without gaining much 
in the way of increased speed, while a smaller boat with fewer rowers would have 
lacked sufficient speed and striking power. During the classical period, since ramming 
was the primary offensive tt:chnique, and since lightness and speed wt:re paramount, 
the rest of the crew was pared down to a bare minimum. In addition to the rowers, 
the standard complement for an Athenian triremt: during the Peloponnesian War con­
sisted of only ten marines, four archers, and about sixteen other crew to sail the boat.b 
§6. At what point the trireme attained its classical specifications is a matter of 
debate. There is likely to have been significant variability among the earliest models. 
Certain fleets of archaic triremes had a reputation for better performance. Herodotus 
praises especially the ships of the Sidonians among the Phoenicians, and the Samians, 
Athenians, and Aeginetans• among the Greek fleets. But he docs not specifY whether 
this is a matter of construction, crew, or condition; his stock praise is simply that the 
ships "moved best in the water." If this was a matter of design, the differences cannot 
have been conspicuous, since there are several incidents of confusion bet\veen enemy 
and friendly ships in the Histories (for example, 7.194.1, 8.87.4). Herodotus does 
mention that Phoenician triremes could be distinguished by the figureheads on their 
prows�> (3.37.2), and at least some ships carried individual insignia (8.88.2, 8.92.2), 
but in general and at least externally all triremes must have looked essentially alike.< 
§7. The number of marines on the decks of these early fleets of triremes did 
vary,• and scholars debate whether tht:se differences in the number of fighting men 
are indicative of substantive differences in ship design and/or battle tactics. Essen­
tially the question is whether marines played a primary or auxiliary role in offensive 
tactics. Or, put another way, at what point did ramming strategies supersede the 
old-fashioned conception of warships as troop carriers? How one understands 
Herodotus is the linchpin to this debate. Can Herodotus' descriptions of certain 
ships/fleets as "better at sailing" or "heavier" (8.60.a) be understood in terms of 
number of marines on board and/or modified designs? How many marines would 
necessitate modifications to ship design (added deck space, tor example)? Does a 
report by Herodotus of an increased number of marines indicate a fleet built for 
S.Sb Sec Figure S.l for a photograph of the O�vmpia�, a 
full-scale trireme constructed in Greece and sailed, 
rowed, and tested in the 1990s; and Figure $.2 for 
a construction and manning diagram of the ship. 
S.6a Sidon: MapS, locator. Athens, Acginl: M.tp $, II X. 
S.6h Sec also Samian ships (not triremes) with boars' 
heads on their prows (3.59.3). 
S.6c In the catalog of Xerxes' fleet (8.89-95 ), the diller· 
cnt contingents arc described in terms of their armor, 
weapons, and dress, but nm by disrinc"tin' trircm.:s. 
S.7a The Chians at Lade fought \\ith a complement of 
40 marines (6.1 5.1 ). (Chios, Lade: MapS, BY.) 
Xerxes sailed \\ith an additional 30 marines on 
dc�k (7.184.2 ). Kleinias' �rcws of 200 conform to 
Lhc dassi�al standard, namely, 10 marines (8.17). 
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FIGURE S.l. THE MODERN TRIREME 0LYMJ>JAS, REING ROWED RY STUDENTS. 
boarcling tactics, or does a small number of marines suggest a battle strategy reliant 
on ramming? 
§8. One indirect indication of an increased emphasis on ship handling might be the 
existence of facilities for hull maintenance. Hull speed would have become a vital fuctor 
>vith the advent of ramming tactics. Thucydides records that the naval commanders of 
the Peloponnesian Wars, when ramming warfare reached its apogee, were concerned 
with keeping their hulls from becoming waterlogged while on campaign,• and archae­
ologists have uncovered the foundations of the shipsheds in which classical Athenian 
triremes were berthed in Peiraieus, their home port.b Herodoms also mentions such 
concerns in connection with triremes. He states it clearly when he specifies that Xerxes' 
fleet (powered by triremes) halted at Zone' to "dry out" (7.59.2). The connection is 
not made explicit in his passing reference to Polykrates' boathouses, but perhaps it is 
not chance that this is the same ruler whom he records making the transition from 
penteconters to triremes.d Whether or not Herodotus' description of Nechos' 
(610-594) fleet of triremes is anachronistic, it is perhaps not coincidental that he men­
tions gear for pulling ships out of the water (holkos) in the same sentence (2.159.1). 
S.8a 71mcydidts 7.12.3-5. 
S.8b The si1.c of these trireme shipshed berths has 
helped scholars and marine designers determine 
at least the maximum dimensions of triremes. Sec 
Figure S.4. 
S.8c Zone: MapS, AY. 
S.8d The term which Herodotus uses for "shipshed" 
in 3.45.4, lltosoiltoi, is a general one, and it 
is possible that these boathouses had been 
built for the pentecontcr fleet, or even for 
nonmilitary usc. 
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fiGURE $.2. CROSS-SECTIONAL DIAGRAM OF A TRJREME, SHOWING PLACEMENT OF ROWlNG 
STATIONS. 
Sea Battles 
§9. Herodotus' account of the battle of Salamis• is his most detailed description 
of a naval engagement; he was a boy when the battle took place, and as a native of 
Halicarnassus,b he must have heard about it-and especially Artemisia's role­
directly from participants on the Persian side. There exists a second contemporary 
source, the Athenian tragedian Aeschylus, who probably took part in the battle. His 
drama The Persians played before an audience that undoubtedly included many who 
had fought at Salamis eight years earlier. The two authors disagree about the num­
bers of ships on each side' and the locations of their ships and tactics at the initial 
attack.d These discrepancies highlight the uncertainties of Herodotus' method, 
reliant primarily upon oral and, most often, secondary or even tertiary sources. 
§10. It should be remembered, too, that literary considerations influenced his 
narrative. So, for example, the figure of Artemisia, who certainly existed and whose 
reported actions may well reflect reality, also serves to illustrate the themes of inver­
sion• and transgressionb and resulting confusion that pervade this history. Herodotus' 
S.9a Salamis: MapS, BX. 
S.9b Halicarnassus: MapS, BY. 
S.9c Herodorus: 1,207 Persian vs. 380 Greek. 
Aeschylus: 1,000 Persian vs. 300 Greek. 
S.9d For detailed discussions, see J. S. Morrison and 
J. F. Coates, Tht Athenian Triremt{l986}, 59...00, 
and, most recent!)•, D. Porter, Bryn Mawr Classical 
Rtvie"' 2006.03.29 (a review of R. T. Wallinga, 
Xerxes' Gruw Adventure: The naval penputive. 
MntmOJynt wpplement 265 [Lciden: Brill, 2005]}. 
S.10a A common theme of Herodotus' ethnographic 
accounts is the depiction of foreign customs as an 
inversion of the normal order. So, for example, 
Egyptian women urinate standing up, but the men 
sit down. 
S.l Ob Boundary crossings and boundary violations, 
physical and behavioral, are a central theme of the 
Hitrories. Herodorus characterizes especially the 
Persian Kings with such actions, as, for example, 
Xerxes' crossing of the Hellespont (MapS, AY} or 
his treatment of the son of the Lydian Pythios 
(Lydia: MapS, BY}. 
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description of Artemisia ramming a Persian ship is an excellent example of this 
combination of historical report and literary topos.< In assessing Herodotus' histor­
ical narrative, it is important to realize that this is first of all a work of literature, in 
which imagery is manipulated and "facts" are tools used to advance the themes of 
his history. 
§11. Even so, it is possible to detect in Herodotus' narrative an increasing 
emphasis on naval warfare (and skills) in its implementation over the course of the 
sixth and early fifth centuries. Fleets grow ever larger, and coalitions become increas­
ingly broad in scope. Battle strategy grows more reliant on rowing tactics and per­
haps incorporates ramming as an offensive weapon. 
§12. Herodotus reports only the barest outlines of the battle at Alalie (535), 
between a fleet of sixty Phocaean ships (probably penteconters) and a Carthaginian­
Etruscan coalition double that size.• Of special interest is his description of the dam­
age to twenty Greek ships: he says that they were rendered unusable by their "rams 
being 'bent back"'b (1.166). This is the earliest extant mention of rams in battle 
(although there are earlier depictions) and, as discussed above, it is possible that this 
awkward image of damage is indicative of newly emergent technology and tactics. 
§13. Less than haifa century later (494), at Lade,• ramming may have been inte­
gral to battle strategy. It is perhaps no coincidence that here, too, the primary role is 
played by a Phocaean commander (Oionysius), in spite of the fact that he heads one 
of the smallest contingents (only three ships!) of the Ionian fleet. Dionysius concen­
trates especially on two maneuvers: sailing in column ( epi keras) and the diekplous, b 
which in classical times consisted of breaking through an enemy line and then turn­
ing rapidly to ram his defenseless side or stern. 
§14. By 480, at Artemision,• the Greeks have become adept at rowing maneu­
vers. The significantly outnumbered Greek fleet successfully defended itself by draw­
ing up into a tight circle ( kuklos), bows facing outward against the enemy. They 
were able to maintain formation and fight successfully until nightfall put a halt to 
the action. 
Dangers on the Waters 
§15. The greatest danger to ships was not battle but storm, and no ancient naval 
expedition ever set sail in the Mediterranean during winter months. The Persian dis­
asters at Athos ( 6.44 .2) and along the coasts of Magnesia (7.168) and Euboea• 
(8.13) vividly confirmed Artabanos' caution to Xerxes: the greatest threat to a large­
scale naval expedition against Greece lay in the lack of adequate havens from storms 
S.l Oc For more on Artemisia, sec R. V. Munson, 
"Artemisia in Herodotus," Cln.ssical Antiquity 7 
(1988), 91-106. 
S.l2a Alalie (Corsica), Carthage: MapS, locator. Pho· 
caca: MapS, BY. 
S.l2b Literally, "They were bent back as to their beaks." 
Other suggested translations: their rams were 
"buckled," "twisted ofT," "badly bent." 
S.l3a Lade: MapS, BY. 
S.l3b Literally, "to sail through and out." Later sources 
associate this maneuver specifically with ramming, 
but Cawkwcll argues that the fully developed 
dick pious was not employed umil the Pclopon­
nesian War and that Herodotus' usc of the word 
indicates only a maneuver used to bring the 
marines into fighting range. See Appendix H, 
The Ionian Revolt, n. 4Cf, and G. Cawkwell, 11Jt 
Greek Wars. The Failure of Persia (Oxford: Oxford 
Univcrsiry Press, 2005 ). 
S.l4a Artcmision: MapS, AX. 
S.l5a Mount Arhos, Magnesia: MapS, AX. Euboca: 
MapS, BX. 
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(7.49.2-3). Ancient naval fleets by necessity hugged the very coasts that posed their 
most imminent danger, for the cramped quarters of warships required regular stops 
for the crew to eat and sleep. Even in good weather, long stretches in triremes 
became exceedingly uncomfortable for the oarsmen. Rowers on the modern 
Olympiasb were much bothered by the heat and stench that quickly permeated their 
close wooden quarters; in the prelude to Lade, Dionysius' rowers endured only one 
week of daylong training regimes on shipboard before rebelling ( 6.12.2-4 ). 
§16. Ships also stayed within sight of coasts because these were their guideposts. 
Stars were no aid to navigation in the narrow latitudes of the Mediterranean; pre· 
served ancient "admiralty charts" (periploi) indicate that mariners set their courses 
primarily by coastal landmarks and estimated speeds and distances. Herodotus may 
have obtained some of the information he cites for the areas of seas and lengths of 
rivers from such mariners' handbooks. Apparently Darius could not get his hands on 
such a guide, and so his first step in the invasion of Greece was to send ahead an 
expedition to reconnoiter the Greek coastline (3.136.1). In fact, Herodotus notes 
several instances in which lack of detailed knowledge of the Aegean coastline caused 
troubles for the Persian fleet (7.183.2, 8.107). The Corcyrians,• on the other hand, 
used local knowledge of geography and weather to their advantage, citing the well­
known storms off Cape Maleab as a plausible excuse for not joining the Greek coali­
tion at Salamis (7.168.4, 4.179.2). 
Seafaring Nations 
§17. Herodotus says that the Aeginetans and, after them, the Athenians fought 
best at Salamis (8.93.1).• Other Greek contingents have their moment in the sun: 
the Milesiansb during Alyattes' reign (1.17.3), the Chians at Lade (6.15.1), and sev­
eral times the Samians.c Herodotus also recognizes the wide-ranging Samian 
(4.152) and Phocaean (1.163.1) merchant fleets. 
§18. But the sailors par excellence of Herodotus' account are the Phoenicians.• 
Phoenician colonists and merchants open his narrative ( 1.1.1) and Phoenician ships 
permeate its entirety. Phoenician warships were the backbone, the heart, and the 
stars of the Persian fleets,b Phoenician merchant ships (gauloi) plied the whole 
sweep of the Mediterranean, and a Phoenician fleet accomplished the circumnaviga­
tion of Africa.< Among the Phoenicians, the Sidonians had special pride of place: 
Xerxes' chosen flagship was a Sidonian vessel (7.100.2, 7.128.2), and a Sidonian 
warship won the rowing match (7.44; especially 7.96) at Abydos.d Unfortunately, 
archaeological, iconographical, and other textual sources for the ships of the Phoeni­
cians are sparse. 
S.15b The ked of the 0/ympianvas laid down in 1985 
and the ship was launched in 1987. 
S.16a Corcyra: MapS, locator. 
S.16b Cape Malea: MapS, BX. 
S.17a See also 5.83.2 for Aeginetan superiority at sea 
(shortly thereafter contradicted by 5.86.2 ). 
Aegina, Athens, Sa.lamis: Map S. 
S.17b Milerus: MapS, BY. 
S.l7c The Samians arc mentioned on four occasions; 
3.44.2, 3.122.2, 5.1 17, 6.14.3. 
S.18a Phoenicia: MapS, locator. 
S.18b The Phoenicians arc mentioned in this capacity at 
3.19.2-3, 5.109.3, 6.6, 6.28.1, 6.31.1, 6.33. 
S.18c Phocnici;�.n circumnavigation of Africa: 4.42; also, 
perhaps 2.1 02.2, 4.43. 
S.l8d Abydos: MapS, AY. 
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fiGURE 5.4. A LATE-NINETEEl-tfH-CENTURY PHOTOGRAPH OF THE REMAINS OF FOUNDATIONS 
AND COLUMN SUPPORTS OF THE ATHENIAN SHIPSHEDS AT PEJRAIEUS. 
§19. It makes sense that Xerxes turned to his expert Phoenician sailors to provide 
the cables that spanned the Hellespont.• He turns also to the Egyptians (7.25, 
7.34.2). Egypt was, of course, the source of papyrus.b But there are hints in 
Herodotus' narrative that the Egyptian facility with cables was due to more than their 
being the source of the raw materials. It is possible that these people of the Nile were 
also premier builders and sailors of seafaring vessels. Herodotus associates triremes 
with Nechos (2.159.1), which would be the earliest appearance of these ships. Fur­
ther indication of Egyptian seamanship may perhaps underlie the reports (2.102.2, 
4.43) that "Sesostris" and Sataspes started their voyages of exploration in Egypt.< 
§20. In contrast to the seafarers, there are those who are not so inclined: Ama­
zons, the Lydians, and the Persians.> 
S.19a Hell�spont: MapS, AY. 
S.19b Egypt: Map S, locator. Papyrus was normally used 
in place of paper in the ancient Mediterranean, 
bur in this case it was used to create some of the 
immense cables which were used to hold Xerxes' 
boat bridges in place (7.25.1, 7.34, 7.36.3). 
S.l9c It is like!)•, however, that they hired Phoenician 
vessels there (4.42). 
S.20a The Lrdians under Croesus ( 1.27); th� Persians at 
1.143.2 (although Persian troops served on ships 
as marines), and the Amazons (4.110.1-2). 
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Merchants and Colonists 
§21. Herodotus' enumeration of fleets only occasionally makes reference to the 
supply ships that accompanied and outnumbered the warships. In contrast to the sleek 
lines of the oared ships designed for speed, cargo ships• were built for capacity, and 
thus their profiles were rounded and full. Merchant traffic through the Hellespont 
was particularly important, for the fertile fields of the Greek colonies in the Black 
Sea provided vital resources of grain to their homelands. Thus, control of these 
straits was strategically important for both sides. But Dionysius' acts of piracy 
against Carthaginian and Tyrrhenianb merchant shipping in Sicily illustrate that dan­
gers beset merchant shipping throughout the Mediterranean ( 6.17). It is perhaps 
because of such dangers that oared warships are regularly associated with coloniza­
tion movements.< 
"Other" Watercraft 
§22. It is only when he discusses foreign watercraft, such as the Armenian boats 
or the baris of the Nile, that Herodotus provides details. In both instances, archaeo­
logical, iconographic, and/or ethnographic evidence corroborates his descriptions. 
Round, skin-covered boats (Arabic: kufah) were sailed down the lower Euphrates 
into the early twentieth century, and just as in Herodotus' account ( 1.149), they 
were broken up at the end of the journey, their skins carried back upstream and 
refitted for another trip downstream. Herodotus also accurately describes the con­
struction of Nile riverboats;• the use of short lengths of acacia wood and a construc­
tion technique reliant upon beams at deck level for the hull were foreign to Greek 
shipbuilding. His descriptions of the mechanics of towing the Nile boats upstream 
and keeping them on course downstream also ring true. 
S.2h Greek merchant ship: IJolkas; Phoenician: 
gtmlos. 
S.2 l b  Carthage, Tyrrhenia (Etruria}: MapS, locator. 
S.2lc Warships associated with colonization: triacon· 
tcrs, 4.148.3; pcmccontcrs, 1.163.1, 4.153, 
4.156.2; triremes, 5.47.1. 
S.22a C. Haldane and C. W. Shelmcrdinc. "Herodotus 
2.96.1-2 Again.» Clnnicnl Q}u<rterly 40 ( 1990), 
535-539, with references. 
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